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Obtaining Certification in the
Supreme Court of Ohio: Cases of
Public or Great General Interest
Paul M. Herbert*
Relying upon his years of experience as a Judge of Ohip's highest
court, Judge Herbert delineates the evolution of the supreme court's cer-
tification procedure and advocates the promulgation of guidelines to
assist members of the bar in determining whether a case is one 9t "public
or great general interest." The author demonstrates that such guidelines
would also be beneficial to the court, because they would reduce the
number of motions which do not merit certification but which must
nevertheless be considered.
" MIHY WAS MY MOTION to certify the record overruled by
A the supreme court?" Or, despairingly, "What is the mean-
ing of 'public or great general interest'?"' Or "What do you have
to do to get into the supreme court?" These and similar questions
have been asked by thousands
THE AUTHOR is a Judge of the Supreme of lawyers since 1912 when the
Court of Ohio. Fourth Constitutional Conven-
tion of Ohio drafted, and the
people adopted, certain amendments to the Ohio Constitution.
When the delegates to the Convention assembled, Ohio was in a
period of transition from a predominately agricultural economy to
an industrial era. The Convention realized that its ultimate task
was the preparation and recommendation of amendments to the
constitution to fashion a judicial structure which would be able to
meet the challenge of changing times.
Prior to the Convention, litigants appealed from the old circuit
court to the supreme court as a matter of right and without resorting
* Acknowledgment is made to my former law clerk, William Bullinger, from Wes-
tern Reserve University Law School and to my present law clerk, Franklin Polk, from
Harvard Law School for the research, counsel, and advice given me in the preparation of
this article. It might be well to observe that the opinions expressed here are not
necessarily those of the other members of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
I The Ohio Constitution provides, inter alia:
[J]udgments of the courts of appeals shall be final in all cases, except
cases involving questions arising under the constitution of the United States
or of this state, cases of felony, cases of which it has original jurisdiction, and
cases of public or great general interest in which the supreme court may di-
rect any court of appeals to certify its record to the court. OHIO CONST.
art. IV, § 6. (Emphasis added.)
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to a motion to certify or for leave to appeal. Consequently, the
court's docket was far in arrears, and the problem was growing
steadily more serious.
Judge Peck2 was the chairman of the Convention committee
which drafted and presented pertinent amendments to the con-
stitution. Speaking to the delegates of the Convention,8 he defined
the essential requirements of a motion to certify:
The words "In cases of public or great general interest," have
been partially construed, and what the committee means is cases of
"public interest" in which the public is interested - state, coanty
or city, some public body - or of "great general interest," cases
which involve questions affecting a good many people and that
have aroused general interest.4
Thus, two distinct classes of cases were recognized: (1) those of pub-
lic interest, and (2) those of great general interest.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary recognizes the
meaning of the word "public" as used by the delegates. The term is
there defined as "relating to, or affecting the people as an organized
community... [as used in the phrase, public authority exists pri-
marily to regulate.. . social and economic life. . . [or as] author-
ized or administered by or acting for the people as a political en-
tity .... ." It follows without doubt that the Convention intended
the word "public" to be confined solely to governmental bodies,
boards, and commissions.
Judge Peck referred to the second class as "cases ... of great
general interest, cases which involve questions 'affecting a good
many people and that have aroused general interest."'  However,
he made a significant distinction between the procedure proposed in
the amendment and the practice followed in the Supreme Court of
the United States when he said to the Convention:
The supreme court of the United States under the federal act
has a right to direct any case that is pending in one of the lower
courts to be certified up to it by a writ of certiorari, but we do not
open the doors so widely. We confine it to cases of public or
great general interest.7
2 Grandfather of the Honorable John W. Peck of the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals, Sixth Judicial District.
3 
PROcEEDINGs AND DEBATES OF THE Omio CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
(1912-13) (two volumes) [hereinafter cited as DEBATES].
4 1 DEBATES 1030. (Emphasis added.)
5 WEBSTER, THmD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY (1961 ed.). (Emphasis
added.)
6 1 DEBATES 1030. (Emphasis added.)
7 Ibid.
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The proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Convention
make it clear that the delegates understood the meaning of the phrase
"public or great general interest." The people apparently under-
stood it when they adopted the amendment. Lawyers could and
would make the amendment far more effective if the supreme court
provided rules defining its meaning. With such rules lawyers would
be in a position to advise their clients that a motion to certify in
certain cases would be in vain and that in other cases it would
probably be successful.
It is my opinion, based upon the experience of passing upon
hundreds of such motions each year, that if the letter and spirit of
the Ohio Constitution and the intent of its authors and adopters
were expressed in dear-cut rules governing motions to certify, sixty
to seventy percent of the motions to certify now being filed would
never have been prepared.
In the circuit court (the immediate predecessor of our present
court of appeals), a losing litigant was permitted to appeal as a
matter of right to the supreme court without its leave being first
obtained. This caused an appalling jam of cases on the court's
docket, a condition which demanded relief. The old circuit court
was abolished, and our present court of appeals was created. It
was plain to observe that a procedure was required which would
bring much of the litigation then burdening the supreme court to
final disposition in the new court of appeals. The Convention con-
cluded that "one trial, one review" was sufficient to satisfy the
ordinary demands of justice.
In the course of the debates, Judge Peck said that "the essential
thing in this bill is the proposition to make what is now the circuit
court a court of last resort for the great bulk of litigation. That is
the important point. That is the reform which I regard as essential
and of great importance to the people of this state."' Another dele-
gate predicted that the proposition would "give you as many su-
preme courts or courts of last resort as you have courts of appeals in
the state."" It might be well to observe that under the proposed
reforms the provision for certification of conflicting decisions among
8 2 id. at 1125. (Emphasis added.)
Old. at 1124. Another delegate observed:
I believe that this proposal that Judge Peck and this committee have con-
sidered and now present to this body will be the means . . . of bringing the
supreme court down to the people's door, and then the people will have their
rights adjudicated at home and in that way the rights of the people will be
subserved better than they are now subserved. Id. at 1105.
[VoL 18: 32
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the courts of appeals would, in time, bring about a uniformity of
opinion among those courts.
The Convention devised a definite plan of procedure which it
followed. The delegates understood the meaning, purpose, and
intent of the amendments proposed to the people and the relation
of each to the whole. The transcript of the "Proceedings and De-
bates" of the Convention provides voluminous source records. The
people were provided with a printed "explanation" of each amend-
ment prior to the election, and a vigorous campaign between pro-
ponents and opponents of the various issues furnished further in-
formation to the electorate. The "Proceedings and Debates" of the
Convention also furnish excellent material for use in applying the
principles of constitutional interpretation as laid down in the first
paragraph of the syllabus in Castleberry v. Evatt,'0 where the su-
preme court stated that "in the interpretation of an amendment to
the Constitution the object of the people in adopting it should be
given effect; the polestar in the construction of constitutional as well
as legislative, provisions is the intention of the makers and adopters
thereof."'1
The recent report of the Committee of the Ohio State Bar Asso-
ciation on Judicial Administration and Legal Reform" contains the
following excellent statement of the theory of the Convention:
The theory adopted was that the Supreme Court should hear,
not more, but fewer cases. The court was to sit not primarily to
deide controversies between parties, but to devote its attention to
the general supervision of the development of a coherent, uniform
and consistent system of law.'3
Article IV, section 2 of the Ohio Constitution, adopted Septem-
ber 3, 1912, defined the structure, jurisdiction, and duties of the
supreme court. This section was again amended in 1944. In this
later amendment, the jurisdiction of the supreme court to review
judgments of the courts of appeals was subjected to a specific limi-
tation by language identical to that found in the 1912 amendment:
"In cases of public or great general interest the supreme court may
... direct any court of appeals to certify its record to the supreme
court... and may review, and affirm, modify or reverse the judg-
ment of the court of appeals."'"
10 147 Ohio St. 30, 67 N.E.2d 861 (1946).
"1 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
'
2 The report was issued February 24, 1964.
131d. at 5. (Emphasis added.)
14 OmO CONST. art. IV, § 2. (Emphasis added.)
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The supreme court has failed to provide any rules or guidelines
to assist the lawyer in determining whether his case merits certifi-
cation. However, in a per curiam opinion the court in Williamson
v. Rubich'5 did observe that "whether the question or questions
argued are in fact ones of public or great general interest rests within
the discretion of the court."' 6  Perhaps a lawyer should gaze into
a crystal ball to devise a method to secure four votes in the court
that reflect discretion favorable to him. Presently he cannot, with
any degree of certainty, intelligently advise his client whether to
seek a review of his case by the supreme court, with all of the attend-
ant expense and effort, or to accept the judgment of the court of
appeals as final.
In 1962, there were filed 437 motions to certify the record and
for leave to appeal; in 1963, 468 such motions; in 1964, 480; in
1965, 472; and in the current year there will be approximately 500
such filings. The court allows from fifteen to twenty percent of
these motions, or from 85 to 100; 400 to 415 are overruled. Sub-
stantial sums of clients' money and countless hours of time, energy,
and effort are expended in vain by lawyers upon motions that are
denied. The growing burden upon the court is becoming an omi-
nous challenge to the administration of justice, and the fashioning
of a more logical method for the disposition of these motions is im-
perative.
Mr. Fred J. Heim, of the Youngstown Bar, became so disturbed
by the confusion arising from the disposition of motions to certify
that he published an article, 7 in which he wrote:
There is no reported case, and no sentence in any reported deci-
sion, which even attempts to define these words, or indicate their
scope or their limitations. I have not only read these decisions,
but I have attempted to determine from an examination of the
cases thus reviewed what the rule is. I must confess that as far as
I am able to determine, there is none. One case will be reviewed
and another case with apparently similar questions will not. I have
also inquired from other lawyers what their opinion is as to what
cases will be certified for review, and I have found no one who
pretends to know more about that subject than I do, and I have
always admitted that I knew absolutely nothing about it. The
consensus of opinion seems to be, as far as I have been able to de-
termine, that the Supreme Court simply reviews those cases which
it desires to and refuses to review all others. I do not say that this
15 171 Ohio St. 253, 168 N.E.2d 876 (1960).
16Id. at 254, 168 N.E.2d at 877.
17 When Does the Supreme Court Require the Courts of Appeals To Certify Their
Records for Review?, 16 OHio L. Rnp. 405 (1918).
[Vol 18:532
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is the rule which the Supreme Court follows, but I must say that
as far as I am able to determine, it seems to be....
This, in my judgment, is a deplorable situation.' 8
Manifestly with some feeling, he continued:
The Supreme Court has had hundreds of cases before it where
this very question was involved and in which it had an opportunity
of indicating the proper scope and meaning of these words. It is
safe to say that if the rules governing the court in these many cases
had been declared and reported, the bar of the state could now de-
termine for itself, in at least a great -majority of cases from such
rules alone, whether or not a given case could be thus reviewed.
As matters now stand, however, neither the bar nor the people of
the state have learned a solitary thing upon this subject since the
amendment was adopted. 19
Another approach was revealed in an address by the late Chief
Justice Carrington T. Marshall, whose subject was "How to Get
Into the Supreme Court."2  Intentionally or otherwise, the late
Chief Justice did not comment upon the meaning of the phrase
"public or great general interest" in his address. However, at the
conclusion of his remarks he stated that he would be very glad to
answer any questions that he could. The first question posed was
as follows:
Q. Mr. Chairman, what is a question of public and great gen-
eral interest?
A. I will have to answer that in this way. The Supreme
Court of Ohio, like supreme courts of, I think, twelve other states
which have similar provisions, and like the Supreme Court of the
United States, has never placed any limitations on that.21
Continuing his answer, he said:
I don't know whether all the members of our court would
agree to what I am about to say, but I believe most of them would,
that if there is a case of real error, a legal proposition which, if not
disturbed, where we think the Court of Appeals has probably ren-
dered an erroneous ruling, whether it is very important or not, I
think the court would correct it by letting in the case. I think you
are always tolerably safe, if you can convince the court there is
error, that you will get your motion allowed
2
The supreme court, in City of Akron v. Roth," accorded some
181 d. at 406-07.
19 Id. at 407-08. (Emphasis added.)
20 Marshall, How To Get Into the Supreme Court and What To Do When You Get
There (pts. 1-2), J. Cleve. B. Ass'n, Feb. 1929, p. 10; March 1929, p. 11.
21 Id. at March 1929, p. 13.
22 Id. at 13-14. (Emphasis added.)
288 Ohio St. 456, 103 N.E. 465 (1913).
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support to this statement in the third paragraph of the syllabus,
where it was required that the motion to certify must show: "(a)
that the case is of public or great general interest, and (b) that error
has probably intervened ... ."" However, in Williamson v. Ru-
bich,' 5 the court in its opinion said that "it follows, of course, that
the sole issue for determination at the hearing upon such motion
is whether the cause presents a question or questions of public or
great general interest as distinguished from questions of interest
primarily to the parties."2
The present Chief Justice of our court, Kingsley A. Taft, in the
early days of his service as a judge of the court, wrote an article
upon the subject of certification,"7 in which he said:
Usually, the problem of getting your case into the Supreme
Court will involve convincing the court that your case is "of public
or great general interest."
This raises the question as to what is a case of public or great
general interest. Certainly, the opinions and decisions of the Su-
preme Court of Ohio have not even hinted at an answer to that
question.
Frankly, I am almost as much in the dark as to the answer to
the question as before I became a member of the court.8
The solution to the problem of how best to eliminate the waste
of money and time of both the supreme court and the lawyers before
it in disposing of futile motions to certify lies in the promulgation of
rules defining questions of "public or great general interest," as well
as guidelines dearly setting out the purpose and meaning of the
phrase "judgments of the courts of appeals shall be final in all
cases except" as stated in article IV, section 6, of the Ohio Consti-
tution.
Guidelines or rules of practice spelling out the function, scope,
and purpose of motions to certify are essential if the intent of the
24 1d. at 457, 103 N.E. at 465.
25171 Ohio St 253, 168 N.E.2d 876 (1960).
2
6Id. at 254, 168 N.E.2d at 877. (Emphasis added.) The late Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, William Howard Taft, speaking for the Court in a
unanimous opinion said:
If it be suggested that as much effort and time as we have given to the
consideration of the alleged conflict would have enabled us to dispose of the
case before us on the merits, the answer is that it is very important that we be
consistent in not granting the writ of certiorari except in causes involving
principles the settlement of which is of importance to the public as distin-
guished from that of the parties .... Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well
Works, Inc., 261 U.S. 387, 393 (1923). (Emphasis added.)
27 Taft, How To Get Into the Supreme Court, 26 OHIo B. 847 (1953).
281d. at 848. (Emphasis added.)
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makers and adopters of the amendments to the constitution is to
be realized. If the appellate procedure provided in the constitution
is conscientiously followed, the courts of appeals will rightfully
assume a vastly more important responsibility than had been con-
ferred upon the circuit courts prior to the Convention of 1912.
More time and opportunity will be available to the members of the
supreme court to direct their efforts to the solution of questions of
vital importance affecting the welfare of the state and the people
and to the creation of "a coherent, uniform and consistent system
of law"2 which will meet the challenge of an ever-expanding
society.
29 JUDIcIAL ADiNItATION AND LEGAL REizORM COMMITrEE oF THE OHo
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, MoTioN To CERTIFY PRAcrIcE 5 (Feb. 24, 1964).
